Effects of heritability on evolutionary cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games  by Liu, Run-Ran et al.
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Physics Procedia 00 (2009) 000–000 
www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia
Effects of heritability on evolutionary cooperation in spatial 
prisoner’s dilemma games 
Run-Ran Liua, Chun-Xiao Jiaa, Bing-Hong Wanga,b*
aDepartment of Modern Physics and Nonlinear 
Science Center, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 
Anhui, 230026, PR China 
bResearch Center of Complex Systems Science, University of Shanghai 
for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, PR China 
Elsevier use only: Received date here; revised date here; accepted date here 
Abstract 
We study the effects of heritability on the evolution of the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. In our model, the fitness of each
player is composed of the instantaneous payoff from the interactions and the inherited fitness from the last generation. Based on
extensive simulations, we find that the density of cooperators is enhanced by increasing the heritability of players over a wide
range of the model parameter. The mean fitness of cooperators and defectors are also studied for understanding our results. 
© 2009 Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Keywords: Heritability; Cooperation; Prisoner's dilemma game; Fitness 
1. Introduction 
Cooperation plays an important role in the real world, ranging from biological systems to economic and social 
systems. Understanding the maintenance of cooperative behavior among selfish individuals is an interesting and 
challenging problem as it contradicts Darwinian selection [1-3]. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) as a general 
metaphor for studying cooperative behaviors, have received much attention in theoretical and experimental studies 
[4, 5]. The PDG seizes the characteristics of conflict between selfish individuals and the collective interests of two 
involved players, which has become the leading paradigm to explain cooperative behavior. In the common 
mathematical formulation of PDG with pairwise interaction, each of the two encountering cooperators (defectors) 
get a payoff R(P), a defector confronting a cooperator acquires payoff T, while the cooperator gains S. The four 
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parameters is required to satisfy the conditions T>R>P>S and 2R > T+S. In a well-mixed population, defectors are 
unbeatable and cooperators are doomed to extinction [2]. 
Since defecting is the dominating strategy for PDG, the cooperative behavior will disappear, which is opposite to 
observations in the real world. Therefore, a variety of mechanisms are proposed to understand the maintenance of 
cooperation [7], one of which was done by Nowak and May, who showed that the PDG on a simple spatial structure 
can enable cooperators to survive by forming clusters within which they benefit from mutual cooperation and 
protecting them from exploitation by defectors [8]. Inspired by the idea of a spatial game, much attention has been 
given to evolutionary games on several population structures, including regular lattices [9-18], small-world 
networks [19-24] and scale-free networks [25-33]. More interestingly, many realistic phenomena are also introduced 
into evolutionary games, such as “Tit-for-tat” [4, 34], “win stay and lose shift” [35], memory effects [36, 37], 
aspiration effects [38, 39], social tolerance [40, 41], social diversity [42], adaptive networks with alternative 
interactions [43-47], different teaching capabilities [48-53], noise in the strategy adoption [54-57] and payoff noise 
[58-62]. 
In most real biological or economic systems, the heritability is ubiquitous. A filial generation can inherit property, 
physical quality and other resources from their parents. In this paper, we assume that players can inherit fitness from 
the last generation. Meanwhile, their fitness should be correlated with their current payoffs from the interactions. In 
our model, we assume that the fitness of a player is determined by two components: one is the inherited fitness; the 
other is the current payoff. In this paper, we focus on the effect of inherited fitness on the evolution of cooperation 
in spatial PDG, and we find that the introduction of inherited fitness can improve the cooperation level of a system 
dramatically. 
2. Model 
We consider an evolutionary two-strategy prisoner’s dilemma game with players located on a square lattice with 
periodic boundary conditions. Initially, either a cooperator or a defector, randomly chosen with equal probability, 
occupies each site. At each time step, each player interacts with its neighbors and collects the payoffs depending on 
the payoff-matrix elements, and self-interactions are excluded. The total payoff of a certain player is the sum over 
all interactions. Following the previous studies [8], the elements of the payoff matrix can be rescaled, i.e., we can 
choose R = 1, P = S = 0, and T = b (>1) without loss of generality in the evolutionary PDG. 
At the tth generation, the fitness fi(t) of the player i is defined as: 
( ) ( 1) (1 ) ( )i i if t f t P tW W                                   ,                                                                                    (1) 
where the parameter ´ denotes the heritability and Pi(t) denotes the payoff of player i at this time. The parameter´
sets the balance between the present and past payoff gains-the relative importance of a previous generations or 
strength of maternal effects decays with a factor´per time step [63]. The values of ´ are in the range [0,1). If ´=0, 
this model reduces to the original one. By tuning the value of ´, one can investigate the effects of the heritability on 
evolution of cooperation. In our model, each player’s initial fitness fi(0) is set to 1. We have check that the precise 
value of fi(0) does not affect our conclusions. 
After collecting payoffs, the players try to maximize their individual payoff by imitating (learning) one of the 
more successful neighboring strategies synchronously. Following previous studies, player i will adopt the randomly 
chosen neighbor j’s strategy sj  with a probability depending on the fitness difference ( fi-fj ) as: 
1
1 exp[( ) ]i i j
W
f f N
 
 
                                ,                                                                                           (2) 
where « characterizes the noise introduced to permit irrational choices [9]. In this paper, we set the noise parameter 
is«=0.1.
Simulations are carried out for a population of N=100h100 individuals. We study the key quantity of cooperator 
density ²c in the steady state. Equilibrium frequencies of cooperators and defectors were obtained by averaging 
over 2000 Monte Carlo time steps from a total of 22000 steps, and each data point results from an average of over 
10 realizations. 
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3. Simulation and analysis 
in dependence on the parameter b for different values of ´.Fig. 1. (color online) Stationary fraction of cooperators ²c
Figure 1 shows how²c varies in dependence on the temptation to defect b for different values of ´. It displays 
that²c decreases monotonically with the increasing of  b, regardless what´ is. Moreover, for a fixed b, different 
values of ´  can affect the final cooperation levels dramatically. To quantify the effects of varying ´  on 
cooperation, we plot²c as a function of parameter´ for different values of  b, as shown in Fig. 2. From Fig. 2, we 
can find that the cooperator density²  increases as the value of´ increases for a fixed value of  b.c
Notice that cooperators tend to form cluster patterns where cooperators assist each other in avoiding defectors' 
exploitation in spatial games. A cooperator (defector) cluster is a connected component (subgraph) fully occupied by 
cooperators (defectors). In order to visualize the effect of ´ on cooperation, we plot some typical snapshots of the 
system at equilibrium for fixed b=1.34 with respect to different values of ´. Fig. 3 shows that the cooperator 
clusters become larger while the defector clusters become smaller as ´ increases. 
in dependence on the heritability´ for different values of b.Fig. 2. (Color online) Stationary fraction of cooperators ²c
Now we investigate the possible mechanisms for the promotion of cooperation. The cooperators can obtain 
steady payoffs by forming compact clusters (see Fig.3). Hence, the cooperators can accumulate large fitness from 
their history. In contrast with the cooperators, the defectors can not obtain payoff as their destructive strategy. Hence, 
they can not obtain fitness from their history. Fig. 4 shows the mean fitness of cooperators and defectors (<fc > and 
<fd>) in the evolution. One can find that <f  > always exceeds <fc d> during the whole evolutionary process. Fig. 5 
shows that, in the equilibrium state, <f  > is no less than <fc d> for most values of ´. For´<0.35, there is no 
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cooperator, both <f  > and <fc d> equal zero. For´>0.75, there is no defector, <f  >  reaches its maximum, and <fc d>
equals zero.  
Now the reason why the heritability promotes cooperation can be understood: the cooperators can accumulate 
large fitness from their history by the heritability, while the defectors can not. Hence, the defectors can not defeat 
the cooperators easily. 
Fig.3. A series of snapshots of distribution of cooperators (white) and detectors (black) on a 100 ×100 square lattice at b = 1.34, for three values 
of´: (a)´=0.4, (b)´=0.6, and  (c)´=0.8. Each snapshot is obtained at the time step t = 20000. 
Fig. 4. (color online) The mean fitness of cooperators and defectors (<f  > and <f >) in the evolution for´= 0.4 and b = 1.2. c d
Fig. 5. (color online) The mean fitness of cooperators and defectors (<f  > and <f >) in the equilibrium state, as a function of ´ for b = 1.2. c d
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4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we have studied the effects of heritability on the prisoner’s dilemma game on regular lattices. The 
heritability of players is controlled by a tunable parameter´. In our model, the fitness of each player is based on the 
instantaneous payoff from the interactions and the inherited fitness from the past. The simulation results show that 
the heritability plays a positive role for the maintenance of cooperators. In order to give an intuitive account of the 
maintenance of cooperation, we provide some typical snapshots of the system and compare mean fitness of 
defectors and cooperators. It is shown that cooperators can survive by forming compact clusters, and cooperators 
can gain more fitness from their history than defectors can. Our work suggests that the heritability plays crucial roles 
in the evolution of cooperation amongst egoistic individuals. Since the heritability is common in most real biological 
or economic systems, we expect our work to shed some new light on the emergence of cooperation. 
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